Essays comprising the second part of the book use regional and state-specific case studies to look at how U. security guarantees affect the willingness of states to support the regime; question the perceived spoiler role of a “vocal minority” within the Non-Aligned Movement; challenge notions that Russia is using the regime to build a coalition hostile to the United States; contrast nonproliferation strategies among Latin American countries; and explain the lag in adoption of an Additional Protocol by some Middle East and North African countries.Getting countries to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts is an ongoing challenge.But at times prevention fails, and policy options for dealing with such powers are scant.
Yet there is an unintended downside to the NPT regime.
By freezing the roster of legitimate nuclear powers at the five that existed in 1968, the NPT makes it difficult for the United States to adopt realistic policies toward countries that have subsequently acquired nuclear weapons.
In fact, nonproliferation policy is much more like a large construction project than an adversary contest.
It may, to be sure, never follow the precise blueprints of its architects, which will always need a degree of improvisation and adjustment.
*** For close to a year now, the Korean Peninsula has teetered on the brink of war.
As North Korea has made dramatic strides in its nuclear and missile programs, the Trump administration has orchestrated increasingly potent U. sanctions against Pyongyang and repeatedly threatened to launch a preventive attack. Nye is Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.He chairs the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation that formulated the Carter Administration's policy.Yet there are many reasons to be skeptical of this overture.Countless diplomatic efforts have failed over the past few decades, including under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. side, it is not clear that the Trump administration has a coherent strategy for the talks, and many crucial diplomatic positions remain unfilled.He has been Professor of Government at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1969-77, and is the co-author of Power and Interdependence and a contributor to Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (the Ford-Mitre Report cited in footnote 3 below).During his election campaign, Jimmy Carter dramatized a broad but inchoate popular concern when he promised that curbing the spread of nuclear weapons would be among his highest foreign policy priorities.Moreover, it has invested huge amounts of economic and political capital in the project, defying the predictions of experts who doubted its capability to develop a sophisticated nuclear arsenal and gaining international clout as a result.This raises a question: If North Korea is highly unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons, why does the United States continue to demand this?The ultimate goal of this coercive campaign, Trump administration officials have made clear, is the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.In recent weeks, North Korea announced a willingness to begin negotiations and suspend nuclear and missile tests in the interim, and President Trump agreed to hold a summit with Kim Jong Un, ostensibly to discuss denuclearization.