The attribution is empirically empty or unconstrained.
Arguably, there is nothing truly exciting about behaviorism loosely understood. This entry is about the doctrine, not the attitude.
“Psychological” behaviorism is committed to the truth of (2).
“Analytical” behaviorism (also known as “philosophical” or “logical” behaviorism) is committed to the truth of the sub-statement in (3) that mental terms or concepts can and should be translated into behavioral concepts.
Analytical behaviorism helps to avoid a metaphysical position known as substance dualism.
Substance dualism is the doctrine that mental states take place in a special, non-physical mental substance (the immaterial mind).
It purports to explain human and animal behavior in terms of external physical stimuli, responses, learning histories, and (for certain types of behavior) reinforcements. If a particular movement, such as pressing a lever when a light is on, is followed by the presentation of food, then the likelihood of the rat’s pressing the lever when hungry, again, and the light is on, is increased.
Psychological behaviorism is present in the work of Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), Edward Thorndike (1874–1949), as well as Watson. Such presentations are reinforcements, such lights are (discriminative) stimuli, such lever pressings are responses, and such trials or associations are learning histories.
Psychological behaviorism’s historical roots consist, in part, in the classical associationism of the British Empiricists, foremost John Locke (1632–1704) and David Hume (1711–76).
According to classical associationism, intelligent behavior is the product of associative learning.